What Reason for the Quest?:
A Response to Professor Scott*
C. Westbrook Murphyt

INTRODUCTION

Professor Kenneth E. Scott was from 1963 to 1967 the General
Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Since then he has
kept abreast of administrative law developments involving the
licensing decisions of the federal banking agencies. His collection
of written opinions by the Comptroller of the Currency approving
branch banks may be the only complete set outside the
Comptroller's Office. More recently, Professor Scott was given access to a random sample of cases from the internal files of the
Comptroller's Office. In view of this extensive background, it is
disappointing to find that his article on the decision-making process in bank regulation' amounts to not much more than a warmed
over-although more entertainingly written-version of ideas expressed in dozens of briefs filed with courts in the last ten years by
plaintiffs seeking unsuccessfully to overturn decisions of the banking agencies.
Professor Scott starts with some erroneous assumptions about
the statutory discretion vested in the Comptroller; continues by
resurrecting issues about hearing procedures and the scope of judicial review that were settled by the federal courts six or seven
years ago; 2 throws in a plug for the issuance of bank charters to
* The views expressed herein are those of the author only, and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Comptroller's Office. Professor Scott originally prepared his
article for consideration by the Administrative Conference of the United States, as a consultant to that Conference. The Comptroller's official response has been sent to the Administrative Conference.
t Deputy Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
1. Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42
U. CHi. L. REv. 235 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
2. The Supreme Court decision in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), was not as unexpected as the Scott article might lead one to believe. On the contrary, the Court's decision
confirmed results already reached by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and District of
Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086
(4th Cir. 1969); Citizens Bank of Hattiesburg v. Camp, 387 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Sterling Nat'l Bank of Davie v. Camp, 431 F. 2d 514 (5th Cir.
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anyone over eighteen who can sign his name, hire a lawyer to fill
out the forms, and persuade enough people to invest the necessary
capital; and concludes that the federal banking agencies should
publish chartering standards, or issue written opinions in every
case, or both. Because of its abundance of irrelevant arguments
and its paucity of discussion about the real issues raised by its
conclusions and recommendations, the article is not of much use in
determining whether or not published standards and written decisions have any valid place in modern banking supervision.
This response will attempt to correct some of the misconceptions
in the Scott article. It will examine critically Professor Scott's assertions that the facilitation of judicial review and the need for good
administration require written explanations of banking agency decisions. An issue not treated by Professor Scott, the possible need
for confidentiality in some banking agency decisions, will be explored briefly. Finally, this response will suggest that there is a
tension between facilitating judicial review and encouraging meaningful discussions of economic and banking issues. In discussing
these questions I will focus principally upon the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, both because of my familiarity with
the Comptroller's Office and because of the similar focus in Professor Scott's article.
EXISTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

Charters
We might begin by noting that the Comptroller has published
regulations concerning the discretionary matters that he investigates in considering new charters. These factors include:
(1) The adequacy of the proposed bank's capital structure.
(2) The earning prospects of the proposed bank.
(3) The convenience and needs of the community to be
served by the proposed bank.
(4) The character and general standing in the community
or [sic] the applicants, prospective directors, proposed officers,
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968);
Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank of
Fairbanks v. Camp, 465 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973). None
of these cases was cited, discussed, or distinguished by Judge Bryant in his opinion for the
court of appeals in Pitts v. Camp, 463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1972). The only banking case cited
by Judge Bryant was his own earlier opinion in First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352
F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
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and other employees, and other persons connected with the
application or to be connected with the proposed bank.
(5) The banking ability and experience of proposed officers
and other employees. 3
This published regulation, together with the questions asked in the
summary of information that each charter applicant must submit
to the Regional Comptroller, 4 outlines the factors considered by
the Comptroller in passing upon charter applications.
These discretionary considerations are derived from sections 17
and 18 of the National Bank Act. 5 Those provisions require the
Comptroller to examine into the condition of any proposed national banking association and to ascertain, among other things,
"generally whether such association has complied with all the requirements of this chapter to entitle it to engage in the business of
banking .
*..
"6 The Comptroller is to examine the information
reported by the organizers of the proposed bank and "any other
facts which may come to the knowledge of the comptroller,
whether by means of a special commission appointed by him for
the purpose of inquiring into the condition of such association, or
otherwise . . . . " If upon this examination it appears that "such
association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of banking, the comptroller shall give to such association a certificate...
that such association is authorized to commence" the business of
banking. 8
A historical examination of this 1864 statute shows that itand not the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act),9 as asserted
by Professor Scott-is the basis of the Comptroller's chartering
discretion. The National Bank Act 10 was a substantial revision
and reenactment of the National Currency Act of 1863,11 which
had created both the national banking system and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency. The first Comptroller of the
Currency, Hugh McCulloch, and the then Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, were the principal authors of the 1864
3. 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(b) (1974).
4. This form is reprinted as the Appendix to the Scott article. Scott 297-98.
5. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, §§ 17-18, 13 Stat. 104, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27
(1970).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
7. Id. § 27.
8. Id.
9. Act of Sept. 20, 1950, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970).
10. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
11. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
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Act. 12 This historical background makes especially important
Comptroller McCulloch's views of the intent of the chartering pro13
visions of the 1864 Act.
In January of 1865 Comptroller McCulloch responded to an
inquiry as follows:
Before sending out Forms, for the organization of a National Bank, it is desired that I should be informed as to the
following points1st, the place where they are to be used, its business, population, etc., etc.
2nd, the parties to the proposed organization.
3rd, what banking facilities exist in the vicinity.
For this reason I have desired all the parties asking for
Forms to address a letter to this office on these subjects.
Other notations on various pieces of incoming correspondence
during 1864 and 1865 give a good picture of Comptroller
McCulloch's views: "Ask for information as to business and population." "Must include best and most responsible businessmen."
"Don't want individual Bank or close corporation." "Can't encourage. One bank there now. Another not profitable to stockholders
or credit to system."' 4 Thus there seems to have been little question
in the mind of the statutory draftsman that discretion was conferred by the language of sections 17 and 18.15
12. In the early 1960s the Comptroller's Office discovered a notebook containing a
pasteup of the 1863 Act with the revisions written in by Comptroller McCulloch and Secretary Chase. This notebook is now with the National Archives.
13. The weight given to contemporaneous administrative construction of federal statutes
is stressed in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), and other cases.
14. This and other similar correspondence was a part of the court record in two of the
cases referred to by Professor Scott. Pitts
v. Camp, 329 F. Supp. 1302 (D.S.C.), vacated, 463
F.2d 632, vacated, 411 U.S. 138 (1971); Olsen v. Camp, 328 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 26 & 27 (1970).
One of Comptroller McCulloch's notations pinpoints one of the reasons the Comptroller
was given broad discretion in the bank chartering field. When asked in January of 1865 if it
was true that his department would receive no more applications for national banks in
Philadelphia, Comptroller McCulloch replied:
I am of the opinion that the Comptroller of the Currency should exercise proper
discretion in the location of Banking under the National Currency Act having reference
to the distribution of the circulation provided for by that act, so that there may not be
an undue amount in one locality to the exclusion of others.
I am also of opinion that the seaboard cities already have their due proportion or
more than that of Banking Capital.
In 1865, of course, the number and location of national banks could have a direct impact on
the money supply, because national banks were authorized to issue bank notes, the circulating medium for the country. Today, in a similar if less obvious way, the Comptroller's
decisions on charters and branches have an impact upon the money supply (over ninety
percent of which is demand deposits in commercial banks), the availability of credit, and the
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Similar statements can be found in annual reports of the Comptroller up to the present day. Contrary to the impression left by
Professor Scott, the notion that the Comptroller lacks discretion to
consider economic, management, or other discretionary factors in
the chartering process has been held only for a brief period by a
few Comptrollers. History would suggest that the Comptrollers
who viewed their chartering role as ministerial rather than discretionary were reacting more to the economic climate of the times,
and to a desire to keep pace in a chartering race with state authorities, than to any close analysis of the language of the National
Bank Act.
Professor Scott therefore errs in stating1 6 that the Comptroller's
authority to exercise discretion stems from sections 4 and 6 of the
FDI Act.' 7 Section 4 requires the Comptroller to certify to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation "that consideration has
been given to" factors enumerated in section 6 of the Act. These
statutory factors 1 8 are similar to those enumerated in the
Comptroller's regulation quoted above; but the latter are not dependent upon the former. The Comptroller's regulation would
stand on the solid base of the National Bank Act even if there were
no federal deposit insurance system. The Comptroller, moreover,
is required to certify only that "consideration has been given" to
the factors; he is not required to certify what investigation he conducted or what conclusion he reached.
The invariable procedure in approving an application to organize a new national bank is to grant preliminary approval based
upon evaluation of the banking, economic, and managerial factors,
with final chartering contingent upon completion of such important steps as selling capital stock, securing a bank building, and
hiring officers and employees satisfactory to the Comptroller's Office. It is not until all these steps have been completed and the
bank is ready to open that the Comptroller certifies to the FDIC
that consideration has been given to the factors enumerated in
section 6 of the FDI Act. The preliminary approval, however, is
effectiveness of the Federal Reserve System (national banks own seventy-five percent of the
assets held by Federal Reserve System member banks).
16. Scott 240.
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814 & 1816 (1970).
18. The factors enumerated in section 6 are:
The financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its
future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the convenience
and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether or not its corporate
powers are consistent with the purposes of this [act].
12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1970).
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considered to be the final action of the Comptroller for purposes
of judicial review, 19 and all the cases challenging the Comptroller's
approval of a national bank charter have been filed, and in some
instances even decided, before the Comptroller has made the
required certification. When an application is disapproved, the
Comptroller neither takes any action under, nor makes any reference to, the FDI Act.
Branches
Although the Comptroller has no published regulations concerning his inquiries into branch applications, he has indicated 20 that he
investigates policy factors almost identical to those contained in his
regulation governing charter applications. As Professor Scott mentioned, branch applicants submit a summary of information similar
to that supplied by new bank organizers. Moreover, the factual
part of the investigating examiner's report is available to the public.
Although these sources may not be familiar to Professor Scott's
audience, they are generally known in the banking industry and
give a comprehensive outline of the factors considered by the
Comptroller.
The statute concerning branch banks provides, in language
which originated with the McFadden Act of 1927,21 that national
banks may establish and operate branches as provided in that statute "with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. '22 As
the court stated in Apfel v. Mellon,'2 3 "an examination of congressional legislation with regard to banking since 1864 shows that
Congress has consistently used various forms of the word 'approve'
in the sense of conferring discretion upon the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Federal Reserve
Board. 12 4 The branch bank statute thus gives the Comptroller discretion to determine what factors he will consider in granting or
denying an application.
ScoTr's ARGUMENTS
Having clearly established the statutory basis for the
Comptroller's exercise of discretion in passing upon applications
PROFESSOR

19. First Nat'l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1974), petition for
cert.filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1975) (No. 963).
20.

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S POLICY GUIDELINES

43-45 (1964).
21. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
23. 33 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 585 (1929).
24. Id. at 807.

FOR NATIONAL BANK DIRECTORS
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for charters and branch banks, we now are in a position to examine
Professor Scott's suggestion that the Comptroller's Office should
publish predictive standards and case by case opinions in order
both to facilitate judicial review and to improve administration of
an important governmental function.
Facilitating Judicial Review
Of the two reasons, the facilitation of judicial review appears
to be the less plausible. Professor Scott himself seems contradictory on this point. In one place he appears to favor "standards or
findings by which [the courts could] examine a record for substantial supporting evidence."2 5 At the same time, he recognizes
that "[j]udicialization of agency decision making is a remedy often
prescribed, but its cost in terms of delay and expense frequently
exceed by a wide margin its contribution toward improving the
quality of decisions. ' 26 Written standards and opinions, used by the
courts in individual cases as touchstones for a substantial evidence
determination, 27 inevitably change the character of judicial review
and judicialize the underlying administrative proceedings.
Lawyers and judges are rarely experts on banking, but they do
know something about semantic hairsplitting. Judicial review of a
written agency opinion focuses not on whether the administrative
decision is good policy, but on whether or not the opinion is well
written-that is, written as a lawyer would write it. In government
economic regulatory agencies that are required by statute to write
25. Scott 257.
26. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
27. There is, of course, no statute requiring the Comptroller to hold formal administrative proceedings or to base his decision upon a formal administrative record. Neither does
any statute define the scope of judicial review. In this situation, "the proper standard for
judicial review of the Comptroller's adjudications is not the 'substantial evidence' test which
is appropriate when reviewing findings made on a hearing record, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)."
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973). The appropriate standard of review is "whether the
Comptroller's [decision is] 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."' Id. at 142, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). The difference between
these two standards was discussed recently by the Eighth Circuit:
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review is a narrow one. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, [401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)]. Its scope is more restrictive than
the "substantial evidence" test which is applied when reviewing formal findings made on
a hearing record. See Camp v. Pitts... ; Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, supra, 370 F.2d
at 387; Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1969) (Stahl, Circuit Judge,
concurring). "Administrative action may be regarded as arbitrary and capricious only
where it is not supportable on any rational basis." Carlisle PaperBox Co. v. N.L.R.B., 398
F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1968). Something more than mere error is necessary to meet the test.
N.L.R.B. v. ParkhurstManufacturingCo., 317 F.2d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 1963).
First Nat'l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1974), petition for
cert.filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1975) (No. 963).
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opinions or make findings based upon an administrative record,
issues frequently are resolved on the basis of whatever factors seem
relevant to the agency head, whether a single individual or a commission. The case is then turned over to a staff member to write an
opinion that would be acceptable to a reviewing court. The staff
member is more concerned with avoiding reversal on appeal than
with explaining the real reason for the decision-assuming he
knows what the reason is. He thus checks all page references carefully, discusses a check list of statutory considerations, and mentions all of the factors the court enumerated in the last case involving his agency, whether or not those factors are important to the
decision at hand. He calculates that, since courts are creatures
guided by precedent, new arguments should be avoided-they may
be unacceptable to a court simply because they didn't appear in the
previous cases. The result is an acceptable collection of words
whose relation to the real issues may be only coincidental.
This is a process which delays agency decisions for several
months (so that it is of dubious value in terms of improving agency
performance) and which, when combined with more and more
judicial review, feeds upon itself, turning the decision-making process more and more into a lawyers' game. Professor Scott nonetheless asserts that the staff of the banking agencies should be increased precisely for this purpose. As suggested in the portion of
Professor Davis's treatise quoted in the Scott article, however, a
comparison of this formal decision-making process with the more
informal approach of the banking agencies "might well prove that
the nonbanking agencies have a good deal to learn from the bank28
ing agencies.1
Considerations of Good Administration
Professor Scott states his real reason for published predictive
standards and/or written opinions as follows:
But however full or inadequate the explanation that the
courts are prepared to demand, the requirements of good
administration are an independent matter. Banking plays too
central a role in our economic system, and the issues at stake in
the administration of entry controls are too important, for a
continuation of the present regime of unexamined and unexplained exercises of discretion. Whether they are ultimately
forced to it by the courts or not, the banking agencies should

28.

1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958).
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articulate their policies and their
reasons-and not in the curt
29
and superficial manner in Pitts.
But this principle is not self-enacting. If the Comptroller could
write standards sufficiently detailed to cover every foreseeable situation, the bank chartering process could be handled by a file clerk,
who would simply compare each application to the check list in the
Comptroller's standards to determine whether the charter should
be granted. Indeed, applicants themselves probably would refrain
from submitting applications that failed to meet the published
standards, and thus the Comptroller would receive only applications that should be approved. If predictable and consistent results
are a desirable goal, this situation sounds like nirvana. Professor
Scott's article offers little help, however, on the difficult problem of
writing such standards.
Although Professor Scott never directly discusses the Comptroller's published chartering standards, he seems to find the similar standards in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to be too
vague. 30 He also finds unenlightening general statements of
philosophy appearing in public speeches and annual reports.3 1 On
the other hand, he notes, 32 in connection with his discussion of
Bank of Haw River v. Saxon, 33 that rigid application of a bankingoffice-to-population ratio produces arbitrary results. Professor
Scott thus tells us to stay away from Charybdis because it is too
frothy and to avoid Scylla because it is too hard. He tells us that a
course exists between these two alternatives, but he gives little gui34
dance on how to find it.
Recommendation 2 of the Scott article carries the seed of a constructive idea when it states:
For branches, therefore, the Comptroller and the FHLBB
should furnish written opinions only when so requested by the
applicant or by objectors, or when the agency believes the case
presents issues of general importance. It would be appropriate
to charge the requesting party an amount commensurate with
35
the time cost of opinion preparation.

29.

Scott 293 (footnote omitted).

30.

Id. at 242.

31. Id. at 243.
32. Id. at 250-51.
33. 257 F. Supp. 74 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
34. Cf. Scott 294 (Recommendation 1).
35. Id. at 294-95 (footnote omitted).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[42:299

There are drawbacks to the notion of issuing opinions in response
to any request accompanied by cash on the barrelhead. 36 The
Comptroller's Office, however, already writes opinions when it
concludes that the case is of general importance, or that an expres37
sion of the Comptroller's reasoning might aid a reviewing court.
The number of such cases is small enough that the Comptroller
can participate personally in a meaningful way in the opinion writing; thus both the staff and the public are sure that the opinion
reflects his views. Indeed, I recall at least one instance in which the
staff wrote two opinions, one approving and one denying an application, and the Comptroller read both, decided the issue, and himself wrote the final opinion. This is a decision process that can
highlight the issues in difficult and unusual cases, although it
hardly can be employed each of the thousand or so times a year
that the Comptroller determines-whether a new banking office is
useful or needed on a particular street corner. The resulting decision also satisfies Professor Scott's goal of informing the public why
the Comptroller acted as he did.
At the theoretical level, it is difficult to argue that the
government-including a lot more of it than just the banking
agencies-should not be forced to spell out in writing for guidance
of the citizenry exactly what its reaction would be to a given set of
circumstances. The absence of such guidelines may have caused
many of us, for example, to experience a brief, agonizing period of
uncertainty wondering what the reaction would be of the traffic
cop who has just discovered us driving three miles per hour faster
than the speed limit. In the real world, however, government
agencies--like other institutions and individuals-do not have time
to write standards concerning the many sorts of circumstances that
might or might not arise. Even if the time were available, the standards produced would likely be of low quality and of little value.
Those of us who are not professors and are faced with a myriad of
concrete problems find it difficult to concentrate upon and give
our best efforts to the writing of abstract predictive standards. And
even with all the time and attention in the world, it is impossible to
design a scheme that will cover every foreseeable situation-which
is probably the reason that Professor Scott's article offers very little
36. As a practical matter, protestants probably always would request an opinion just to
obtain the delay involved. Additionally, if these opinions provide the great public benefit
imagined by Professor Scott, it hardly seems fair to charge a private party for it.
37. See, e.g., Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. Bank of Cal., 492 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1974),
which reviewed a decision of the Comptroller, supported by a written opinion, authorizing
the Bank of California, N.A., San Francisco, to establish and operate a branch in Seattle.
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guidance about what his proposed regulation would look like. Simply from lack of foresight, any predictive standards probably would
not cover the difficult and unusual cases-the very ones on which
guidance would be most useful. I thus hesitate to embrace Professor Scott's suggestion that the banking agencies develop published
criteria until I know more than the Scott article tells me about some
of the practical problems involved.

THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY

One practical problem that the Scott article fails to explore concerns the way in which a published decision sometimes affects the
solvency of a particular bank. An unfavorable opinion from a
banking agency can shatter public confidence in a banking institution. This problem is illustrated by the factual background surrounding Olsen v. Camp 3 8-a case discussed by Professor Scott. In
that case organizers of a proposed new bank sought judicial review
of the Comptroller's denial of a charter application. As Professor
Scott notes, executive privilege was claimed-ultimately by the Secretary of the Treasury-for a portion of the file relating to the
unsatisfactory condition of other banks with which some of the
applicants were then associated. 39 Because of possible consequences for these banks, the Comptroller refused to produce in
court these portions of the file, and litigated for more than two
years various discovery questions relating to these documents.
Meanwhile, Bank of the Commonwealth, a billion-plus dollar
bank located in Detroit and the lead bank in the group of banks in
question, filed two applications with the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. One application was to establish an overseas branch in Nassau; the other was to charter a foreign banking
corporation under the provisions of the Edge Act. 40 The Board of
Governors denied the applications in separate, simultaneous written opinions on the ground that "the general character of Bank of
the Commonwealth management and the bank's financial history
and condition, including its liquidity and capital positions, militate
against approval." The publication of these decisions began a disastrous year for Bank of the Commonwealth and several other banks
associated with it. Bank of the Commonwealth was saved from
insolvency by a $35 million loan from the FDIC. Birmingham38. 328 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
39. Id. at 730-31.
40. Act of Dec. 24, 1919, ch. 18, 41 Stat. 378, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 el seq. (1970).
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Bloomfield Bank, a $60 million institution located in Birmingham,
Michigan, was declared insolvent-although the FDIC was able to
give financial assistance in a transaction by which a newly chartered
state bank assumed all of Birmingham-Bloomfield's deposit
liabilities, thus preventing any loss to depositors. Other banks in
the group experienced serious, but less severe, problems.
Although publication of the opinion by the Federal Reserve
Board apparently solved some supervisory problems that had been
facing the banking agencies, 4 1 and although the result for the
shareholders and management of these banks might be called
'just," a substantial risk was created for the banks' depositors. The
Olsen case thus illustrates that the underlying philosophy of bank
regulation-protection of depositors-does not always mesh well
with a system of public disclosure of facts whose publication could
result in the bank's insolvency. Should the Comptroller be required
publicly to assert that a bank management is incompetent
42
whenever he denies a branch bank application on that ground?
The question could sustain a lively debate on the philosophy of
bank regulation, but the issues involved are barely touched in the
Scott article, 4 3 much less explored in any meaningful way. Such an
exploration is necessary to any intelligent consideration of Professor Scott's four recommendations.

THE TENSION BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
MEANINGFUL POLICY STATEMENTS

Professor Scott, after discussing the cases, concludes that 'judicial review of the Comptroller's decisions that is both limited and
intelligent seems to be . . . as far away as ever." 44 He also notes
that policy statements and rulemaking are preferable to opinions
in individual cases, but that "[t]here is little that courts can do to
,,45 Finally
force an agency to use its rulemaking authority ....
he contends that "the requirements of good administration are an
41. Publication of the opinion also resulted in voluntary dismissal of the Olsen case
without the contested documents ever having been produced.
42. The bank itself would be told the reason for the denial because the Comptroller's
Office would use the denial to encourage the applicant to run a better bank.
43. At one point, Scott 294, the article suggests that public confidence in a bank in financial difficulty would be "unwarranted." Stating that a situation is "unwarranted" does
not remove the difficult problem of finding an acceptable way to accomplish improvements.
44. Scott 268.
45. Id. at 291 (footnote omitted).
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independent matter," and that "[w]hether they are ultimately
forced to it by the courts or not, the banking agencies should articulate their policies and their reasons.. .. 46
Professor Scott fails to draw what may be the obvious conclusion
from this reasoning: that courts are not and cannot be very effective in promoting the articulation of economic and banking
policies; therefore, that goal might be achieved better by curtailing
or eliminating judicial review of licensing decisions rather than by
increasing it. It already has been suggested that there is limited
value in altering administrative procedures solely to facilitate judicial review. What now is suggested is the converse: perhaps the
nature of judicial review should be changed to facilitate the administrative process.
As already noted, judicial review does not encourage an agency
to engage-through rulemaking, decisions, or otherwise-in the
debates necessary to articulate economic and banking standards of
the kind sought by Professor Scott. Instead, lawyers and judges,
with their penchant for precedents, tend to look for and question
any variation between the administrative decision under review, on
the one hand, and prior agency or court cases on the other. This
practice encourages administrative agencies to recite rote formulas
rather than to undertake thoughtful analysis of subtle economic
and public policy issues. Thus, if candid, forthright statements of
policy are preferred, we should consider discouraging, rather than
encouraging, judicial review.
Judging by the record of the last ten years, if judicial review of
the Comptroller's licensing decisions were eliminated altogether
nobody would miss it but lawyers. The Comptroller has never lost a
case challenging his grant or denial of a charter. In the branching
area, the losses have averaged fewer than one out of the several
dozen cases decided each year-and few of those losses have been
of any significance. The impact of judicial review upon the agency
decision-making process, therefore, has not been significant.
The principal result of judicial review of the Comptroller's decisions has been to subject successful applicants to unwarranted and
expensive delays. Unfounded preliminary injunctions were becoming so common in North Carolina that the Comptroller had to
appeal one of them in an effort to discourage litigants from bringing suits for the sole purpose of delay. 47 In the District of Columbia, the district court's preliminary injunction in Wood County Bank
46. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted).
47. The case appealed was First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 42 F.2d 481 (4th
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v. Camp,48 which it issued without requiring any kind of bond,
was met with a shrug by the court of appeals; 49 indeed, in First
National Bank of Fairbanks v. Camp, 50 the court of appeals itself had
issued, ex parte and without any bond, an order closing down the
branch involved for more than a year, despite a summary judgment for the Comptroller granted by the district court. Recently,
the Tenth Circuit-on its own motion, without soliciting the views
of the parties, without requiring any bond, and without referring
to the considerations usually involved in staying administrative
decisions 5 '-enjoined, pending further proceedings, the imminent
opening of a new bank that had sold its shares, built its building,
and hired its officers and employees. 52 If Professor Scott were to
examine these cases, he might have more faith in the banking
agencies and less in reviewing courts.
Elimination of judicial review in the licensing area would not
leave the Comptroller free of all economic and banking standards
and all principles of fairness. First, as Professor Scott points out in
his advocacy of free banking, 53 even when the Comptroller's approval is obtained the public still determines whether there is a
need for a particular banking office. I once heard a judge suggest
from the bench that if the plaintiff bank would serve its customers
better it would not need to worry about the new competition it was
seeking to prevent. I often wonder why more courts have not
reacted similarly. Second, my suggestion of a cutback in judicial
review assumes an expansion in the Comptroller's administrative
expression of his licensing policies; so accountability can be had
through the political process and in the philosophical market place
of ideas. The district court in Warren Bank v. Saxon 54 explained this
idea as follows:
Cir. 1970). Plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes have told me point blank that they have brought
cases or considered bringing cases solely for the delay involved.
48. 348 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C.), vacate4, 489 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
49. The appellate court action referred to in the text was an unreported denial of a
motion for summary reversal of the district court's injunction. But FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c)
appears to require a bond before issuance of a preliminary injunction. This should be
compared with the discretionary language in FED. R. App. P. 8(b).
50. 465 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973), aff'g 326 F. Supp.

541 (D.D.C. 1971).
51.
1958).
52.
53.
54.
1966).

See, e.g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir.
American Bank of Tulsa v. Smith, 503 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1974).
Scott 284.
Warren Bank v. Saxon, 263 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.
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A Response to Professor Scott

We will assume, even, that the Comptroller was "wrong" in his
decision. But there is no requirement in the law that he always
be "right." His broad discretion includes the discretion to
make a mistake. The theory behind the statutory scheme is
that with enough mistakes collective action will ultimately come
from the citizenry at the polls. Thus reviewability, save in ex55
treme cases, is not entrusted to the courts.
Professor Scott seems to have started with the premise that judicial review is a positive good and, with somewhat less assurance, to
have suggested that the process of bank licensing should be altered
to increase the availability and effectiveness of judicial review. I
suggest, instead, that what Professor Scott really wants is a lively
debate on the economic and other standards that should govern
bank chartering, with the banking agencies keeping score in the
form of published predictive standards. That no such lively debate
has been facilitated by judicial review even Professor Scott seems to
recognize. That such a debate may be discouraged by judicial review is a possibility which he disappointingly does not discuss.
CONCLUSION

It may be that the banking agencies should write more opinions
or develop published standards. But Professor Scott does not explain to us very well why this is so and fails even to suggest how the
banking agencies might go about it. I hope that the Administrative
Conference of the United States will not feel compelled to justify
its investment in Professor Scott's article 5 6 by adopting his four
recommendations-at least not without a good deal more careful
study than has so far been undertaken.
55.
56.

Id. at 38.
See note * supra.

